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1 Introduction
Migration is more costly for those who are owners of their house. It is well known that
selling and buying a house entails some costs that renters do not need to pay. Therefore,
it is not surprising that home-owners migrate at a much lower rate than renters. The
empirical evidence shows that being a home-owner has a negative eﬀect on geographic
mobility, even after controlling for the diﬀerent characteristics of home-owners and
renters.1
Oswald (1996) underscored the possibility that home-owners' lower levels of migra-
tion have an eﬀect on the labour market. In particular, what is known as the Oswald
hypothesis states that a higher home-ownership rate implies a higher unemployment
rate. The main reason behind this idea is that home-owners' mobility costs prevent
them from migrating when labour prospects in their location are poor. This implies
that it takes longer for them to get jobs and, as a consequence, their unemployment
rate is higher. However, the empirical studies on this issue ﬁnd the opposite result.2
The mechanism behind the Oswald hypothesis is that higher migration costs hinder
mobility for work-related reasons. However, one should also take into account the
eﬀect of these costs on the migration for non-work-related reasons. Non-work-related
migration also aﬀects the labour outcomes of workers even if the reason that motivates
it is not related to the job market. A clear example is the case of an employed worker:
Except for close moves, migration requires that an employed worker quits his job.
Therefore, if home-owners' migration costs reduce the rate at which they migrate for
non-work-related reasons, their transition rate to unemployment should be lower.
The aim of this paper is to study the eﬀect of home-owners' migration costs on
unemployment. Its main contribution consists in including non-work-related migration
and its impact on the labour outcomes of workers. In addition, in this paper I focus
on the transition rates both into and out of unemployment in order to explain the
unemployment rate. I develop a job search model with two locations that diﬀer in the
wages they oﬀer and the rate at which job oﬀers arrive. The population consists of
home-owners and renters, who only diﬀer in their costs of migration.
The economy is subject to shocks, referred to as local shocks, that aﬀect simul-
taneously the wage and the arrival rate of job oﬀers in each location. I consider the
1Recent estimates can be found in Caldera and Andrews (2011) and Coulson and Grieco (2013).
2The empirical literature includes Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004); Munch et al. (2006, 2008);
Battu et al. (2008); Coulson and Fisher (2009); Zabel (2012); Laamanen (2017); Blanchﬂower and
Oswald (2013); Taskin and Yaman (2016).
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migration generated by local shocks as work-related-migration. This kind of migration
can also be triggered by accepting a non-local job oﬀer or by losing a job. Migration for
non-work-related reasons is introduced through the assumption that workers have idio-
syncratic preferences with respect to the locations, which are also subject to shocks.
Although the reason that triggers migration can be classiﬁed as work and non-work
related, migration decisions in the model depend on the interaction of the incentives
provided both by the labour market and by the elements external to it.
Workers not only can accept or reject the job oﬀers they receive but they can also
quit their job. I assume that an employed worker who migrates necessarily quits his
job. Thus, migration costs also aﬀect the unemployment rate through the employment
exit rate.
I solve the model numerically with the parameters calibrated to match some fea-
tures of the US labour market. The model generates that home-owners have a lower
unemployment rate than renters, despite being restricted by their migration costs. This
result is consistent with the empirical evidence in Coulson and Fisher (2009) for the
US, who ﬁnd that home-owners have a lower probability of being unemployed.
I ﬁnd that unemployed home-owners have a higher job ﬁnding rate than renters.
On the other hand, renters have a higher employment exit rate than home-owners.
So both transitions contribute to the lower unemployment rate of home-owners. With
respect to the job ﬁnding rate, Taskin and Yaman (2016) have already estimated that
in the US it is higher for home-owners. With respect to the employment exit rate I use
data from the Current Population Survey and ﬁnd that it is higher for renters. Since
the mechanism in the model for this relationship is the quitting behaviour of workers,
their quits rate is also calculated. Taking into account only those quits that imply a
transition from employment to unemployment, I ﬁnd that in the Current Population
Survey the quits rate for home-owners is 61% lower than it is for renters.
The model implies that it is also possible that renters have a lower unemployment
rate than home-owners. In particular, when the incentives provided by the idiosyncratic
preferences to live in a location are lower and when the diﬀerence in wages across
locations is higher.
Various theoretical models that relate home-owners' migration costs and unemploy-
ment have been proposed in the literature. Dohmen (2005) studies how this interaction
is aﬀected by workers skills. In Coulson and Fisher (2009) the introduction of ﬁrm
behaviour implies that although home-owners have a higher unemployment rate, an
increase in the proportion of home-owners does not necessarily lead to higher unem-
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ployment at the aggregate level. In Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2010) home-owners and
renters not only diﬀer in their mobility costs, but also in their housing costs (for ex-
ample mortgage payments). Finally, Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2012) develop a model with
search frictions in both the labour and the housing markets, in which locations are
heterogeneous at the level of wages. They ﬁnd that the locations with higher wages
have a higher home-ownership rate and a lower unemployment rate. This result, which
is consistent with the empirical evidence, is also true here.
In this literature, migration costs imply that home-owners have a lower job ﬁnding
rate and a higher unemployment rate than renters.3 The diﬀerent result found here can
be explained by non-work-related migration and the assumption that choice of location
aﬀects the arrival rate of job oﬀers for the worker. This is not the case in the previous
models.4 In contrast, the assumption that a worker's job prospects depend on where
he is located is common in the literature on regional reallocation, for example Shimer
(2007) and Lkhagvasuren (2012).
Models that study the interaction between the housing market, migration and the
labour market but that do not take into account housing tenure include Rupert and
Wasmer (2012), Nenov (2015) and Sterk (2015). Among these, the present paper is more
closely related to Rupert and Wasmer (2012) who study the role of housing frictions on
unemployment in a model that includes non-work-related migration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy.
Section 3 analyses the eﬀect of the cost of migration on workers' employment decisions.
Section 4 implements the numerical calibration and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setting
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a measure 1 of inﬁnitely lived workers
who are risk neutral. They discount the future at a rate r. There are two locations, 1
and 2, indexed by c ∈ {1, 2}. The utility of workers depends on their income, x and
3In Dohmen (2005) this is so conditional on the level of skills of home-owners and renters.
4This kind of migration has a diﬀerent nature from relocation for non-employment reasons in Head
and Lloyd-Ellis (2012). The latter receives this name because it generates random migration (in
opposition to directed migration) but the moves are associated with receiving a job oﬀer. Therefore,
they do not aﬀect the transition into unemployment. In addition, in their model this kind of moves
does not involve any decision by the worker.
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their preference b ∈ {0, 1} for the location they reside in. A worker with income x and
preference b has utility u (x, b) = x + b¯b with b¯ > 0. Workers are subject to preference
shocks that arrive at a Poisson rate λB. When this kind of shock hits a worker with
preference b, his preference turns to −b.
Workers can be either employed or unemployed. They receive job oﬀers from each
location at a rate that does not depend on their labour market status. An oﬀer from the
current location of the worker will be referred to as a local job oﬀer while an oﬀer that
does not come from his location will be referred to as a non-local job oﬀer. A worker
receives local job oﬀers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate αy > 0 with
y ∈ {h, l}. Non-local job oﬀers arrive at Poisson rate εαy. The parameter ε implies that
workers that are not resident in a location may receive job oﬀers from that location at a
diﬀerent rate than residents. Employed workers live and work in the same location and
receive income wy with wl ≤ wh. At any time, y = h in one of the locations whereas
in the other y = l . In the location with y = h, workers receive local job oﬀers at rate
αh but non-local job oﬀers at rate εαl. Similarly, in the location with y = l, workers
receive local job oﬀers at rate αl but non-local job oﬀers at rate εαh. The economy
is subject to local shocks that arrive at a Poisson rate λY . When this type of shock
hits the economy, location h turns to l and vice versa. Employed workers are subject
to separation shocks with Poisson rate s. A worker hit by a separation shock becomes
unemployed. Unemployed workers' income is z with 0 ≤ z < wl.
There are four types of shocks in the economy: local shocks, preference shocks,
separation shocks and job oﬀers. When workers receive any of these shocks they decide
whether or not to quit their job (if they are employed), whether or not to accept a job
oﬀer (if they have received one), and whether or not to migrate to the other location.5
If a worker with preference b migrates, his preference turns to −b and he must pay
a cost C. In Section 4, I will simulate this economy assuming that there are two
type of workers: workers with migration costs, the home-owners, and workers with
no migration costs, the renters. The type will be exogenously given. Since being a
home-owner or a renter will only aﬀect the problem of the worker through C, in this
section I omit housing tenure from the description of the model, which applies for any
worker with migration cost C ≥ 0.
5For simplicity, it is assumed that the worker can decide to migrate after any kind of shock except
after receiving a local job oﬀer. This assumption does not aﬀect the results of the model.
5
2.2 Worker's Problem
The state of a location can be summarized by the variable y. I denote the value of a
worker with preference b who lives in the location in state y, as Ve (b, y), with e = w
if he is employed and e = u if he is unemployed. Since employed workers receive job
oﬀers at the same rate as the unemployed, we have that Vw (b, y) > Vu (b, y). This
relationship is used to simplify the deﬁnitions of the values of the workers below.
The value of an employed worker satisﬁes
rVw (b, y) = u (wy, b) (1)
+εα−y
(
max
{
Vw (−b,−y)− C, Vw (b, y)
}− Vw (b, y))
+s
(
max
{
Vu (−b,−y)− C, Vu (b, y)
}− Vw (b, y))
+λB
(
max
{
Vu (b,−y)− C, Vw (−b, y)
}− Vw (b, y))
+λY
(
max
{
Vu (−b, y)− C, Vw (b,−y)
}− Vw (b, y)) .
This worker has a utility ﬂow u (wy, b) and can receive four diﬀerent type of shocks.
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First, he receives a non-local oﬀer with rate εα−y. If he receives the oﬀer, he can accept
and migrate, reject and migrate, keep the current job in c or quit the job and remain
in c. Since Vw (b, y) > Vu (b, y), neither the second nor the forth case maximize the
worker's value, so they are omitted. The worker will obtain the maximum between the
value of accepting the non-local oﬀer and migrating, Vw (−b,−y)−C, and the value of
keeping the current job in c, Vw (b, y).
The second type of shock in equation (1) is the separation shock, which comes at
a rate s. In this case, the worker will choose between remaining in his location, which
has value Vu (b, y), and migrating, which has the value Vu (−b,−y)− C.
Finally, the worker also receives a preference shock with rate λB and a local shock
with rate λY . In both cases, the option of quitting the job and remaining in his current
location does not maximize his value and is omitted. However, he still has to choose
between remaining employed in his current location and migrating. In the case of a
preference shock his preference will become −b. Therefore, his value will be Vw (−b, y)
if he remains in his location. On the other hand, if he moves, he must quit his job.
Thus, he will obtain Vu (b,−y)−C. In the case of a local shock, the state of the current
location of the worker turns to −y and the value that the worker will obtain if he
6According to the setting, he can also receive a local job oﬀer. Since this type of shock does not
aﬀect the value of the worker, it is omitted from equation (1).
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remains is Vw (b,−y). On the contrary, if he migrates, his location will be in state y,
which implies that he will obtain the value Vu (−b, y)− C if he migrates there.
The value for a worker who is unemployed, has preference b and lives in the location
in state y is Vu (b, y) and satisﬁes
rVu (b, y) = u (z, b) (2)
+αy (Vw (b, y)− Vu (b, y))
+εα−y
(
max
{
Vw (−b,−y)− C, Vu (b, y)
}− Vu (b, y))
+λB
(
max
{
Vu (b,−y)− C, Vu (−b, y)
}− Vu (b, y))
+λY
(
max
{
Vu (−b, y)− C, Vu (b,−y)
}− Vu (b, y)) .
This worker has a utility ﬂow u (z, b) and can receive four diﬀerent shocks: he can
receive a local job oﬀer, a non-local job oﬀer, a preference shock and a local shock. The
values he can obtain in each case are derived analogously to the case of the employed
worker.
The solution of the system given by (1) and (2) makes it possible to obtain the
policy rules of the workers. The optimal migration decision of a worker is deﬁned as
me (b, y, e
′) = I
(
Ve′ (−b,−y)− C > Ve (b, y)
)
, (3)
where e is his labour market status, b is his preference, y is the state of the location where
he lives and e′ will be his labour market status if he decides to migrate. The function I (·)
is the indicator function, which is equal to one if condition Ve′ (−b,−y)− C > Ve (b, y)
is satisﬁed.
2.3 Workers' Transition Rates and Flows
Using the policy rules in (3) and the Bellman equations (1) and (2), it is possible to
compute workers' transition rates between employment and unemployment. According
to the Bellman equation for an employed worker, a worker becomes unemployed if he
receives a separation shock or if, after a preference or a local shock, he migrates. There-
fore, the employment exit rate (or transition rate from employment to unemployment)
of a worker with preference b and in the location in state y is
eu (b, y) = s+ λBmw (−b, y, u) + λYmw (b,−y, u) .
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Similarly, from the Bellman equation for an unemployed worker, one can calculate
the unemployment exit rate of a worker (or transition rate from unemployment to
employment) with preference b and in the location in state y as
ue (b, y) = αy + εα−ymu (b, y, w) .
3 Relationship Between the Migration Costs and the
Employment Decisions
In this section I study the eﬀect of the migration cost on the labour decisions of the
workers. In order to make the analysis as simple as possible, I consider the case in
which the two locations have the same wage and the same arrival of job oﬀers, wh = wl
and αh = αl = α, and there are no local shocks, λY = 0. The wage is normalized to 1.
These simplifying assumptions are reasonable for an economy whose regions have a low
degree of heterogeneity and allows analysis of the role of the preference for the current
location, b.
Workers' labour decisions are given by the policy rules included in ue (b, y) and
eu (b, y). The unemployment exit rate, ue (b, y), depends on mu (b, y, w). On the other
hand, the employment exit rate, eu (b, y), depends on mw (b, y, u). As the problem is
the same in the location in state h and in the location in state l, I omit variable y in
this section. Proposition 1 focuses on mw (b, u). It states that, if the worker lives in his
preferred location, that is if b = 1, the value of remaining employed in his location is
higher than the value of migrating and becoming unemployed, that is, mw (b, u) = 0.
However, if the worker does not live in his preferred location, this will be true only if
the migration cost is greater or equal to threshold R1.
Proposition 1. There is a migration cost value
R1 =
1
r + 2λB
(
b¯− r + 2λB + αε+ s
α + r + λB + s
(1− z)
)
such that: if C < R1 and b = 0, mw (b, u) = 1; otherwise, mw (b, u) = 0. R1 is positive
when b¯ > r+2λB+αε+s
α+r+λB+s
(1− z).
Proof. See Appendix.
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This result determines the transition rate to unemployment, eu (b). As λY = 0,
there are only two reasons for a worker to become unemployed, either he receives a
separation shock or he is hit by a preference shock and quits. Proposition 1 implies a
worker only quits his job if b¯ is suﬃciently large, he receives a preference shock that
turns his preferences into b = 0 and his migration cost is low enough. In this case,
eu (b = 1) = s+ λB.
The policy rule included in ue (b), mu (b, w), determines the acceptance decision of
an unemployed worker who receives a non-local oﬀer. Proposition 2 and 3 establish
that, for a worker to accept a non-local oﬀer and migrate, it is necessary that the
migration cost is below some threshold, denoted as R2 when the worker has preference
b = 0 and R3 when the worker has preference b = 1. Threshold R2 is positive for any
combination of parameters, so when b = 0 there is always a range of migration costs
for which the optimal policy rule is to migrate. The results in proposition 2 and 3 are
consistent with the idea that workers with high migration costs are restricted to their
local labour market. However, for some range of the parameters, the migration cost
must also be above another threshold in order for a worker to accept a non-local oﬀer.
In particular, when b = 1 and λB > Rλ, the migration cost must be above the threshold
denoted as R4 in order for the worker to accept a non-local oﬀer. It must be said that
this threshold is not always binding; if b is suﬃciently low, then R4 < 0. On the other
hand, if b is suﬃciently high, then R4 = R3 (as can be seen in the Appendix). So, if
the value of b is suﬃciently high, workers do not migrate for any value of the migration
costs.
Proposition 2. There is a migration cost value
R2 =
b¯
r + 2λB
+
1− z
α + r + s
such that: if C < R2, then mu (b = 0, w) = 1; otherwise, mu (b = 0, w) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3. There are migration cost values, R3 and R4, and a value for λB, Rλ
(R3, R4 and λB are deﬁned in the Appendix) such that:
If λB ≤ Rλ and C < R3, then mu (b = 1, w) = 1;
If λB > Rλ and R4 < C < R3, then mu (b = 1, w) = 1;
Otherwise, mu (b = 1, w) = 0.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The result that a worker accepts a non-local oﬀer for some migration cost and rejects
it when this cost is lower is not intuitive. This depends on how Vu (1) and Vw (0) vary
when the migration cost changes. When λB > Rλ, b is such that 0 < R4 < R3 and
C is in a neighbourhood of R4, both Vu (1) and Vw (0) are decreasing with C, but the
eﬀect on Vu (1) is larger, which makes Vw (0)− Vu (1) increasing with C. Although this
situation is possible in the model, it cannot arise with the values of the parameters
found in the calibration section. Using them and taking the value of αl for α delivers
Rλ = 0.36. If λB had this value, it would imply an average duration between shocks of
3 months. The calibrated value for this parameter is λB = 0.0029.
We can now compare the transition rates of two workers, a renter and a home-owner,
who only diﬀer in their migration costs. Let the cost be zero for the renter and Co > 0
for the home-owner. The results in this section imply that the renter's transition rate
from employment to unemployment is greater than or equal to the home-owner's rate.
Furthermore, it is strictly greater if the workers live in their preferred location (b = 1),
b¯ > r+2λB+αε+s
α+r+λB+s
(1− z) and Co ≥ R1. In this case, the home-owner's transition rate to
unemployment is s, whereas an employed renter becomes unemployed at rate s + λB.
On the other hand, the model implies that, for λB ≤ Rλ, the home-owner's transition
rate from unemployment to employment is lower or equal to that of the renter, with
strict inequality depending on the value of Co.
The next question is how the transition rates of home-owners and renters compare
between each other without conditioning for preferences. Notice that an employed
renter can have a lower transition rate to unemployment than a home-owner if the
renter lives in his preferred location and the home-owner does not. This will be the
case if Co < R1, which implies that the renter's transition is s and that of the home-
owner is s+λB. Similarly, if an unemployed renter lives in his preferred location and an
unemployed home-owner does not, the home-owner's rate to employment can be greater
than that of the renter. In particular, if R3 < 0 and Co < R2. The unconditional
transition rates depend on the distribution of workers with diﬀerent preferences. In
the following section I calibrate the model and compute numerically the distribution of
workers in order to obtain those transition rates.
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4 Numerical Results
4.1 Calibration
In this section I study numerically the role of migration costs on unemployment and
migration for the version of the model presented in Section 2. I simulate the model
with the parameters calibrated to the US economy for the period 2005-2014. A time
period is one month. There are two type of workers: home-owners, with migration costs
C = Co, and renters, with migration costs C = 0. In this section, I make explicit the
dependence of the transition rates on housing tenure, that I denote by ht. To compute
the model, I simulate the Poisson local shocks for a period of 600 months. At time
0, the population distribution is set such that the proportion of home-owners is 68%.
This is the average home-ownership rate of the population in the labour force living in
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) during the period 2005-2014 according to the
Current Population Survey (CPS). I also assume that 50% of home-owners and renters
prefer location 1 and the other half location 2. For a description of how the population
distribution is calculated, see Appendix A.
I normalize wh to 1. Following Shimer (2005), I set r = 0.004. The parameters wl,
z, Co and λY are set to directly match an associated target in the data. The remaining
ones, b¯, ε, αh, αl, s and λB are jointly calibrated so that the model matches several
targets related to the labour market and the migration behaviour of workers. Below I
discuss the data sets and targets used.
For the migration costs, I consider that Co is the home-owners' transaction costs in
selling and buying a house. Gruber and Martin (2003), with data of the Consumption
Expenditure Survey, report that these amount to 9.5% of the value of home-owners'
houses. In order to obtain the median value of a home-owner's house I use the American
Housing Survey, that provides this value as a proportion of annual income, with income
deﬁned as the income a household receives when the members are employed. I use the
surveys from 2005 to 2013, and obtain that the median value of an owner-occupied
house is 35 times the monthly income. This implies that transaction costs are 3.3 times
the monthly income. I set Co = 3.3wh = 3.3.
As is standard in search models, I target the unemployment rate and the job ﬁnding
rate of unemployed workers. I also include the rate at which workers quit their jobs to
become unemployed. I calculate these targets with the micro data of the CPS obtained
from IPUMS (Flood et al., 2015). In the model, the job ﬁnding rate is obtained as
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the mean of ue (b, y, ht) weighted by the population distribution conditional on being
unemployed at the beginning of month t. On the other hand, the quits rate is obtained
as the mean of eu (b, y, ht) − s weighted by the population distribution conditional on
being employed at the beginning of month t. The quits rate that I calculate, both in the
model and in the data, only includes quits associated to an employment exit transition
into unemployment. Appendix B contains details on the computation of these targets
in the data.
The degree of heterogeneity across locations in the arrival rate of job oﬀers and wages
(given by αl/αh and wl/wh) can be accounted for by targeting the level of heterogeneity
across MSAs in job ﬁnding rates and real wages. However, the CPS sample is not
designed to be used at this level of disaggregation. In addition, the model only requires
computation of two rates: one for the location in state h and one for the location in
state l. Thus, I classify the MSAs as being h or l using data on employment and
unemployment from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) of the Bureau of
Labour Statistics. The LAUS series are based on the CPS but also on other sources, like
unemployment insurance claims counts, the Current Employment Statistics survey of
establishments and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. For each year, I
use the LAUS data to classify the MSAs with an unemployment rate above the average
as l and those with an unemployment rate below the average as h. Then, I use the CPS
to calculate the job ﬁnding rate of the unemployed and the median nominal wage for
the workers who live in each of these two types of locations. I also use the classiﬁcation
of the MSAs as h and l from the LAUS data to calculate λY . I deﬁne this as the rate
at which the MSAs change type and consider that a MSA changes type if the change
lasts for more than a year. The parameter is calculated as the average across MSAs
weighted by their labour force size.
One diﬃculty that arises when using data at the MSA level is that the deﬁnition of
the MSAs changes through time and, thus, each data set may use a diﬀerent deﬁnition
of MSA. In Appendix B I describe the geographic dimension of the data sets used in
the calibration and how I homogenize them to a single deﬁnition of MSA.
From the LAUS data, I obtain that λY = 0.0078. From the CPS sample I obtain
that the average job ﬁnding rate of the unemployed during the period was ue = 32%, the
ratio between the job ﬁnding rate in the l and the h MSAs was 0.83, the unemployment
rate was urate = 7.1% and the quits rate was q = 0.22%.
Real wages are calculated as nominal weekly earnings from the CPS deﬂated by the
Regional Price Parities from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These price indexes are
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available from 2008. I obtain that wl = 0.94. With respect to unemployment income,
it is equal to 70% of wh, which is between the values proposed by Shimer (2005) and
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Therefore, z = 0.7.
I include two targets related with the migration behaviour of workers: the migration
rate and the reallocation rate. Following Nenov (2015), I deﬁne the migration rate in
period t as
migt =
∑
i
outratei,t
popi,t
popt
,
and the reallocation rate as
realt =
1
2
∑
i
|inratei,t − outratei,t| popi,t
popt
,
where inratei,t is the in-migration rate in the MSA i in period t with origin in another
location of the US , outratei,t is the out-migration rate in the MSA i in period t with
destination to another location in the US, popi,t is the population in MSA i in period
t, and popt is total population for the MSAs in the sample in period t. Although
the CPS provides information on inter-county migration, it is not possible to calculate
ﬂows among MSAs because the data do not identify the county of origin. It would be
possible to compute inter-state ﬂows but that would miss some ﬂows across MSA that
are intra-state. Therefore, in order to obtain the level of migration and reallocation,
I use data on annual inter-county ﬂows from the Internal Revenue Service to obtain
migration ﬂows across MSAs. I ﬁnd that the annual migration rate during the period
was mig = 3.3% and the reallocation rate was real = 0.29%. Appendix A contains how
these rates are computed in the model.
Table 1 reproduces the targets used for the calibration of b¯, ε, αh, αl, s and λB and
their values from the model. The model matches the targets very well. The parameter
values are in Table 2.
4.2 Benchmark Results
The unemployment and transition rates generated by the model for renters and home-
owners are reported in Table 3. I ﬁnd that the home-owners' unemployment rate is 5.4%
(0.4 percentage points) lower than that for renters. The model also provides the workers'
transition rates. Home-owners have a higher unemployment exit rate and a lower
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Table 1: Calibration targets
Data Model
urate 7.1% 7.1%
ue 32% 32%
ue l to h 83% 83%
mig 3.3% 3.4%
real 0.29% 0.29%
q 0.22% 0.20%
Notes: Calculations are based on MSA level data in the period 2005-2014. The
model is simulated 3000 times for 650 time periods keeping the last 600 time
periods. urate is the unemployment rate,ue is the unemployment exit rate, ue
l to h is the ratio between the unemployment exit rate in the l and the hMSAs,
mig is the annual inter-MSA migration rate, real is the reallocation rate and
q is the quits rate.
Table 2: Parameters
Pre-set Parameters
Parameter Description Value
r discount factor 0.004
wh wage in the location in state h 1
wl wage in the location in state l 0.94
z unemployment income 0.7
Co migration cost home-owners 3.3
λY arrival rate of local shocks 0.0078
Jointly-calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
b¯ preference parameter 0.11
ε non-local oﬀer parameter 0.069
αh local arrival rate of job oﬀers from h 0.35
αl local arrival rate of job oﬀers from l 0.29
s arrival rate of separation shocks 0.023
λB arrival rate of preference shocks 0.0029
employment exit rate than renters. Therefore, both transitions contribute to home-
owners having a lower unemployment rate. The diﬀerence in relative terms is higher for
the employment exit rate, 5.2%, compared to only 0.5% in the case of the unemployment
exit rate. To further understand the contribution of these two transitions, consider what
the unemployment rate for each group of workers would be if their transition rates in
all periods are the values in Table 3 and the labour market is in steady state. Renters'
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Table 3: Unemployment and transition rates (model)
Renters Home-owners Diﬀerence
urate 7.37% 6.97% -0.40***
ue 31.92% 32.09% 0.17***
eu 2.54% 2.41% -0.13***
q 0.29% 0.16% -0.13***
Notes: The model is simulated 100 times for 650 time periods keeping the last 600
time periods. urate is the unemployment rate,ue is the unemployment exit rate, eu
is the employment exit rate and q is the quits rate. Test of signiﬁcance performed
on coeﬃcient β in the regression xit = β+eit with xit being the diﬀerence between
the home-owners' and the renters' rate in simulation i and period t. Coeﬃcients
with *** are signiﬁcant at 1% level.
unemployment rate would be 2.54%
2.54%+31.92%
= 7.37% and home-owners' unemployment
rate would be 2.41%
2.41%+32.09%
= 6.98%. These are almost the same values as those generated
in the simulations. If home-owners had the same employment exit rate as renters,
their unemployment rate would be 2.54%
2.54%+32.09%
= 7.33%, whereas if they had the same
unemployment exit rate, it would be 2.41%
2.41%+31.92%
= 7.01%. Therefore, the diﬀerence in
the employment exit rates implies that the home-owners' unemployment rate is 4.9%
lower than the renters', while for the case of the unemployment exit rate this is only
0.5%.
I ﬁnd that employed renters who live in their preferred location (i.e. with b = 1)
quit their job and migrate whenever they receive a preference shock but not when they
receive a local shock. Therefore, the transition rate from employment to unemployment
for this group of workers is simply s+λB.
7 Furthermore, this behaviour implies that all
employed renters live in their preferred location. Thus, s+λB is the renters' employment
exit rate. Employed home-owners who live in their preferred location follow the same
policy as renters only when the location is in state l. However, if the location is in
state h, neither a local shock nor a preference shock make them migrate. This implies
that the home-owners who live in the location in state h do not quit as long as this is
their preferred location. In addition, their policy implies that in the location in state h,
there are some employed home-owners who do not live in their preferred location. Those
workers quit their job and migrate when there is a local shock but they only account
for 5% of employed home-owners in h.8 Therefore, most home-owners who live in h do
7The transition rates conditional on preferences, the state of the location and housing tenure are
in the Appendix.
8Table 7 in Appendix C contains the distribution of workers.
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not quit their job after a shock, which implies that the home-owners' employment exit
rate is lower than that for renters.
With respect to the unemployment exit rate, the model implies that both groups of
workers follow the same policy: they accept a non-local oﬀer only when living in the
non-preferred location. However, all unemployed workers live in their preferred location,
which implies that unemployed workers do not accept non-local oﬀers. Despite having
the same policy, home-owners have a higher unemployment exit rate than renters. This
is because the proportion of unemployed home-owners in the location in state h is higher
than the proportion of renters (from Table 7 in Appendix C we can obtain that 49% of
the home-owners who are unemployed live in the location in state h, while this is 46%
for the case of renters). In turn, the proportion of unemployed across locations matters
because the arrival rate of job oﬀers is higher in the location in state h.
The diﬀerence in unemployment rates between home-owners and renters in the CPS
is much larger than in the model, the home-owners' unemployment rate is 4.64 percent-
age points lower than the renters', that is, 45.5% lower. A likely reason for this is the
endogeneity of housing tenure in the data: workers with bad labour market outcomes
do not buy a house. Indeed, controlling for demographic variables in a probit regression
I ﬁnd that, on average, being home-owner decreases the probability of unemployment
by 1.7 percentage points in 2014, the last year of the sample. I also calculate the eﬀect
in the ﬁrst year of the sample, 2005, and the result is very similar, 1.9. These values are
much lower than 4.64 but they are still sizeable and signiﬁcant. The regression includes
as controls the age, educational level, race and occupation of workers. Appendix C
contains the results with the CPS data.
Further evidence is provided by Coulson and Fisher (2009), who estimate the eﬀect
of being home-owner on the probability of unemployment using an instrumental variable
method. The data they use is the 1990 Census Supplement of the CPS with the
sample restricted to married males. They ﬁnd that being a home-owner decreases
the probability of being unemployed by 3.6 percentage points.
Regarding the unemployment exit rate in the CPS, the diﬀerence between home-
owners and renters is not signiﬁcant. Graphically, this can be seen in Figure 1, where
the time series for these two groups of workers have been depicted for the period from
2005 to 2014. The unemployment exit rate of renters and home-owners cross many
times during the period. In this respect, it is interesting to mention the empirical
evidence provided by Taskin and Yaman (2016). In their analysis they use data from
several panels (1996 to 2008) of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. They
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(a) Unemployment exit rate
(b) Employment exit rate
(c) Quits rate
Figure 1: Transition rates
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estimate the eﬀect of being a home-owner on the job ﬁnding rate of unemployed males,
controlling and without controlling for ownership selection. When that is not controlled
for, the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant but when they do control for ownership selection the
eﬀect is signiﬁcant and amounts9 to 13%.
I am not aware of any empirical study that estimates the eﬀect of home-ownership
on the employment exit rate with US data. However, Munch et al. (2008) estimate for
Denmark that being a home-owner decreases the likelihood of leaving employment for
unemployment by 29%. Similarly, De Graaﬀ and Van Leuvensteijn (2013) estimate it for
14 European countries and ﬁnd that it decreases by 21%. In the model, the channel that
makes the employment exit rate of home-owners lower is their quits policy. Consistent
with this idea, their quitting rate according to the CPS is 61% lower.
Summarizing, the model predicts that home-owners have a lower unemployment
rate than renters and that both the employment exit rate and the unemployment exit
rate contribute to this pattern. The empirical evidence is consistent with these facts.
This is an improvement with respect to the previous literature (Coulson and Fisher,
2009; Head and Lloyd-Ellis, 2012), where migration costs do not generate a lower unem-
ployment rate. In addition, the model implies that the diﬀerence, in relative terms, in
the employment exit rates is larger than the diﬀerence in the unemployment exit rates.
The empirical evidence also seems to be in line with that. Finally, future work will be
needed to quantitatively match the diﬀerence in unemployment between home-owners
and renters.
4.3 The Role of Migration for Non-Work-Related Reasons
The model includes migration for non-work-related reasons through the parameters b
and λB. In order to further understand the role of this type of migration for the labour
market, Table 4 contains the transition, unemployment and migration rates for diﬀerent
values of these parameters.
With respect to λB, both an increase of 30% and a decrease of 30% generate the
same qualitative result as in the benchmark case; renters have a higher unemployment
rate, a higher transition rate from employment to unemployment and a lower transition
rate from unemployment to employment than home-owners. The employment exit rate
increases with λB, as both home-owners and renters quit their job more often. In
contrast, the unemployment exit rate only increases for home-owners, as the proportion
9In Table 9 they report a coeﬃcient of 0.12. Thus, the eﬀect is given by exp (0.12)− 1 ' 0.13
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Table 4: Labour market outcomes for diﬀerent values of λB and b
Benchmark
λB b
30% higher 30% lower 30% higher 30% lower
renters
- urate 7.37% 7.60% 7.13% 7.37% 6.74%
- ue 31.92% 31.92% 31.92% 31.92% 33.40%
- eu 2.54% 2.63% 2.45% 2.54% 2.41%
home-owners
- urate 6.97% 7.08% 6.86% 7.37% 6.91%
- ue 32.09% 32.14% 32.05% 31.92% 33.11%
- eu 2.41 2.45% 2.36% 2.54% 2.46%
of those workers in location h increases. The unemployment rate of both home-owners
and renters increase with λB.
Parameter b aﬀects the migration and unemployment rates only through changes
in the policy rules of workers. If b is 30% higher, renters have the same policy rules
as in the benchmark case, so their transition and unemployment rates do not change.
However, the policy rules of home-owners change and become the same policy rules that
renters have. Therefore, in this case both groups of workers have the same transition
and unemployment rates. If parameter b is 30% lower, the two groups of workers have
diﬀerent policy rules. With respect to renters, these policy rules imply that they do
not quit their job after receiving a preference shock in h and that they accept non-
local oﬀers when they live in l. As a consequence, they have a lower transition rate
from employment to unemployment and a higher transition rate from unemployment
to employment compared with the benchmark case. And, thus, a lower unemployment
rate. On the other hand, the change in home-owners' behaviour consists in them
not migrating any more when they end up being unemployed in h, h being their less
preferred location. This implies that the proportion of home-owners living in h is
higher, which increases their unemployment exit rate and their employment exit rate.
The positive eﬀect on the employment exit rate is due to two facts: ﬁrst, the home-
owners in h with b = 0 are the ones who quit when they receive a local shock whereas
the workers in l are the ones who quit when they receive a preference shock; second,
the arrival rate of local shocks is larger than the arrival rate of preference shocks. The
positive eﬀect on the unemployment exit rate is due to h having a higher job oﬀer rate.
In addition, the unemployment exit rate also rises because the unemployed home-owners
in h with b = 0 accept non-local job oﬀers from l. The home-owners' unemployment
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Table 5: Labour market outcomes for diﬀerent degrees of inequality across locations
Benchmark
αh−αl
αl
wh−wl
wl
30% higher 30% lower 30% higher 30% lower
renters
- urate 7.37% 7.40% 7.34% 6.74% 7.37%
- ue 31.92% 31.77% 32.04% 33.40% 31.92%
- eu 2.54% 2.54% 2.54% 2.41% 2.54%
home-owners
- urate 6.97% 6.99% 6.96% 6.97% 6.97%
- ue 32.09% 31.99% 32.17% 32.09% 32.09%
- eu 2.41% 2.41% 2.41% 2.41% 2.41%
rate decreases. However, not as much as the renters' rate. Therefore, if b is 30% lower,
renters have a lower unemployment rate than home-owners. It is interesting to note
that the decrease in b reduces the incentives to migrate from h to l (renters do not quit
their job any more in order to migrate to l, home-owners who are unemployed in h
do not migrate any more) and increases the incentives to migrate from l to h (renters
accept non-local oﬀers from h).10 Thus, the reduction in b increases the incentives to
live in h. In the next subsection I modify the incentives for living in h through the
diﬀerences in the wage and the job oﬀer rate across locations.
4.4 The Role of Heterogeneity across Local Labour Markets
Table 5 contains the results for diﬀerent values of αh, αl, wh, wl .
I consider an increase and a decrease of αh−αl
αl
by 30% with αh and αl such that their
average does not change. I ﬁnd that both for a higher and a lower level of inequality in
job oﬀer rates, renters have a higher transition rate from employment to unemployment,
a lower transition rate from unemployment to employment and a higher unemployment
rate than home-owners, as in the benchmark case. In fact, these changes in the job
oﬀer rates do not aﬀect the policy rules of workers. A lower αh−αl
αl
has a positive eﬀect
on the unemployment exit rate in both groups of workers. This is because there are
more unemployed workers in the l location than in the h location, which implies that
the increase in αl has a higher impact than the decrease in αh.
With respect to wages, I look at changes in wh−wl
wl
, but also keeping the average of
10The fact that now unemployed home-owners accept non-local oﬀers from l when b = 0 is not
because they have higher incentives to migrate to l. In the benchmark case, they followed the same
rule but then there were no unemployed home-owners in h with b = 0.
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the two wages constant. As was the case for parameter b, wages aﬀect the migration
and unemployment rates only through changes in the policy rules. A 30% decrease in
wh−wl
wl
has no eﬀect in these rules. On the other hand, an increase of 30% changes the
policy rules of renters but not of home-owners. The eﬀect on renters is that now they do
not quit their job after receiving a preference shock in h and that they accept non-local
oﬀers when they live in l. The result is that renters have a lower unemployment rate
than home-owners.
The numerical exercises realized in this and the previous subsection imply that the
result that renters have a higher unemployment rate than home-owners depends on the
level of inequality between the local wages and the utility obtained from idiosyncratic
preferences. Idiosyncratic preferences provide incentives to live in the location with less
job opportunities for part of the population. Therefore, if the utility obtained from this
source is lower, the incentives to live in h are higher. Consistent with that, I ﬁnd that
a decrease in b of 30% produces the same eﬀect on renters as an increase in wh−wl
wl
of
30%. In these cases, renters' unemployment rate is lower than home-owners'.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a model of job search and migration that makes it possible to
study the role of mobility costs in unemployment. Migration has direct eﬀects on the
labour situation of workers by triggering quits, allowing the acceptance of new jobs or
implying a change in labour income. But it also aﬀects the labour market by relocating
the population across space.
The calibrated version of the model generates the result that home-owners, while in-
curring higher migration costs than renters, experience less unemployment. This result
can be explained by their higher transition rate from unemployment to employment and
their lower transition rate from employment to unemployment. The empirical literature
has focused mainly on the ﬁrst of these two channels. However, the evidence presen-
ted in this paper suggests that the transition rate from employment to unemployment
should be further investigated. The analysis of the model also highlights the importance
of workers' distribution across space. The kind of moves that migration costs prevent
tend to be moves from the location with good job prospects to the location with poor
job prospects.
The results indicate that a model with non-work-related migration and heterogen-
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eous locations delivers a pattern in the unemployment rates of home-owners relative to
renters that is qualitatively consistent with the data. Therefore, the model is suitable to
be extended to the study of the home-ownership rate at the aggregate level. This would
imply the inclusion of the ﬁrm side into the labour market and, possibly, externalities
in the housing market, as indicated in Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2013).
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Appendix
A Model details
Let nt (b, c, e, ht) be the measure at time t of a worker with preference b who lives in
location c, with labour market status e and housing tenure ht. Equations (4) and (5)
state the ﬂows from and into nt (b, c, w, ht) and nt (b, c, u, ht) when there is no local
shock with the state in location c at time t denoted by y.
·
nt (b, c, w, ht) = αynt (b, c, u, ht) (4)
+εαymu (−b,−y, w, ht)nt (−b,−c, u, ht)
+εαymw (−b,−y, w, ht)nt (−b,−c, w, ht) + λB (1−mw (b, y, u, ht))nt (−b, c, w, ht)
− (s+ λB + εα−ymw (b, y, w, ht))nt (b, c, w, ht)
·
nt (b, c, u) = λBmw (−b,−y, u)nt (b,−c, w) (5)
+s (1−mu (b, y, u))nt (b, c, w) + smu (−b,−y, u)nt (−b,−c, w)
+λBmu (−b,−y, u)nt (b,−c, u) + λB (1−mu (b, y, u))nt (−b, c, u)
− (αy + εα−ymu (b, y, w) + λB)nt (b, c, u)
The ﬁrst four terms in equation (4) contain the inﬂow of workers to nt (b, c, w, ht).
This ﬂow comes both from workers that are employed and unemployed. The unem-
ployed workers that become employed at c with preference b are those who already live
in c and have preference b and ﬁnd a local job,αynt (b, c, u, ht), and those that live in
−c have preference −b for their location and ﬁnd a non-local job (the second term).
For the case of the employed, the ﬂow is composed of those workers who work in −c,
have preference −b for their location and migrate to work in c (third term) and those
that already work in c, have preference −b and their preference changes into b.
The last term in (4) contains the outﬂow from nt (b, c, w, ht). The outﬂow rate is
composed of the workers who receive a non-local oﬀer and accept, and of the workers
that receive a separation shock or a preference shock.
The evolution of nt (b, c, u, ht), given in equation (5), is calculated in a similar way
as for the employed.
Suppose that at time t0 the economy is hit by a local shock and that the measure
of workers according to (4) and (5) at t0 is n˜t0 (b, c, e, ht). Let the state in location c
after the local shock be y. Then,
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nt0 (b, c, w, ht) = (1−mw (b, y, u, ht)) n˜t0 (b, c, w, ht) (6)
nt0 (b, c, u, ht) = (1−mu (b, y, u, ht)) n˜t0 (b, c, u, ht)
+mw (−b,−y, u, h) n˜t0 (−b,−c, w, h) +mu (−b,−y, u, h) n˜t0 (−b,−c, w, h) .
From t0 and until the arrival of the following local shock the measure of workers
is given again by (4) and (5). For each simulation, I save the population distribution
generated at the beginning of each month. That is, I obtain nt (b, c, e, ht) for t =
1, 2, 3..., 600.
Next I describe how the migration rates are calculated. Let the state in location
c in month t be y. If there is no local shock, the migration ﬂow out of location c in
month t is given by∑
b
∑
ht
(smu (b, y, u, ht) + λBmw (−b, y, u, ht) + εα−ymw (b, y, w, ht))nt (b, c, w, ht)
+
∑
b
∑
ht
(εα−ymu (b, y, w, ht) + λBmu (−b, y, u, ht))nt (b, c, u, ht) .
Therefore, in order to compute the migration ﬂows I assume that the population
distribution is constant during the month. In the months where a local shock takes
place, the ﬂow additionally includes∑
b
∑
ht
∑
e
me (b,−y, u, ht)nt (b, c, e, ht) .
The annual migration rate is calculated as the sum of the monthly migration ﬂows
from both cities. In the computation of the migration rate in the model, all ﬂows are
taken into account. However, in the data, the migration ﬂow of a person who has
already migrated that year is not taken into account. Given that the migration rate is
so low, this diﬀerence is unlikely to be important. Reallocation in year τ is given by∑
b
∑
ht
∑
e
∣∣n12τ (b, c, e, ht)− n12(τ−1)+1 (b, c, e, ht)∣∣ .
Proof to Proposition 1:
The system given by (1) and (2) does not satisfy Vu (0, y) − C > Vw (1, y). Therefore,
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mw (1, u) = 0. On the other hand, mw (0, u) = 1 if and only if Vu (1, y)−C > Vw (0, y).
The condition for this inequality to be satisﬁed is C < R1 with:
R1 =
1
r + 2λB
(
b¯− r + 2λB + αε+ s
α + r + λB + s
(1− z)
)
Proof to Proposition 2:
The policy rule satisﬁes mw (0, u) = 1 if and only if Vw (1,−y) − C > Vu (0, y). The
condition for this inequality to be satisﬁed is C < R2 with:
R2 =
b¯
r + 2λB
+
1− z
α + r + s
Proof to Proposition 3:
The policy rule satisﬁes mw (1, u) = 1 if and only if Vw (0,−y) − C > Vu (1, y). When
λB < Rλ, the inequality is satisﬁed when C < R3 with:
Rλ =
1
4
(
2α + r + 2s+
√
4α2 (1 + 4ε) + 9r2 + 28rs+ 20s2 + 4α (3r + 4εr + 6s+ 4εs)
)
R3 =

−b(α+λB+r+s)+(2λB+εα+r+s)(1−z)
−2λ2B+2α2ε+r2+3rs+2s2+λB(r+2s)+α(2λB+r+2εr+2(1+ε)s)
if B2 < b¯
1
(r+2λB+2αε)
(
−b¯+ α2ε(1+ε)+(2λB+r)(2λB+r+s)+α(λB(2+4ε)+r+2εr+2εs)
α2(1+ε)+α(2+ε)(λB+r+s)+(r+s)(2λB+r+s)
(1− z)
)
if B1 < b¯ ≤ B2
1
α+r+s
(
(1− z)− (α+r+2λB+s)(r+s+α+εα)
(2λB+r)(2λB+r+s)+α(2λB(1+ε)+r+εr+2εs)
b¯
)
if 0 < b¯ ≤ B1
B1 =
(2λB + r) (2λB + r + s) + α (2λB (1 + ε) + r + εr + 2εs)
2 (α2 (1 + ε) + α (2 + ε) (λB + r + s) + (r + s) (2λB + r + s))
(1− z)
and
B2 =
2α2ε2 + (2λB + r) (2λB + r + s) + α (λB (2 + 4ε) + r + 2εr + 2εs)
2 (α2 (1 + ε) + α (2 + ε) (λB + r + s) + (r + s) (2λB + r + s))
(1− z)
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When λB > Rλ, the inequality is satisﬁed when R4 < C < R3 with R3 given above and
R4 given by:
R4 =
−b (α + λB + r + s) + (2λB + εα + r + s) (1− z)
−2λ2B + 2α2ε+ r2 + 3rs+ 2s2 + λB (r + 2s) + α (2λB + r + 2εr + 2 (1 + ε) s)
B Data Appendix
This part of the Appendix describes how targets are obtained from the data and the
geographic dimension of the data sets.
Computation of targets
For the computation of the job ﬁnding rate of unemployed workers and the quits
rate there are two aspects that must be taken into account. First, in the model workers
can have only two labour market statuses, which means that the unemployment exit
rate is equal to the job ﬁnding rate of the unemployed. But in the data there are
workers who enter or leave the labour force. Second, the model is in continuous time,
the unemployment exit rate derived in subsection 2.3 is an instantaneous rate whereas
the data is monthly. Following Shimer (2012) I compute the probability, in the data,
that an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job in month t as
UEt = 1− ut+1 − u
s
t+1
ut
,
where ut is the number of unemployed in month t and u
s
t is the number of short term
unemployed (workers who have been unemployed between 0 and 4 weeks) in month t.
Therefore, the probability is calculated as one minus the proportion of the unemployed
who do not leave unemployment. The instantaneous rate is uet = −log (1− UEt).
Shimer (2012) also proposes a measure of the employment exit rate. I adapt his
approach to compute the quits rate. As mentioned in Section 4, the quits rate that I
calculate only includes quits associated to en employment exit transition into unem-
ployment. First, let the probability of ﬁnding a job for a worker who has previously
quit his job be
UEq,t = 1−
uq,t+1 − usq,t+1
uq,t
,
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where uq,t is the number of unemployed in month t, who have quit their job and u
s
q,t
is the number of short term unemployed who have quit their job. The instantaneous
rate is ueq,t = −log (1− UEq,t) and the instantaneous rate of quitting the job, qt, is
obtained from the following equation:
uq,t+1 =
(1− exp (−ueq,t − qt)) qt
ueq,t + qt
(et + uq,t) + exp (−ueq,t − qt)uq,t,
where et is the number of employed in month t.
The geographic dimension in the data sets
The CPS uses the deﬁnitions of MSAs established by the Oﬃce of Management
and Budget. Not all MSA are identiﬁed in the survey and the deﬁnitions are not
constant through time. The CPS uses the 1993 deﬁnitions for the period 1995-2004,
the 2003 deﬁnitions for 2005-2014 and the 2013 deﬁnition from 2015 on. In order to have
homogeneous deﬁnitions I restrict the period of the calibration to 2005-2014. Therefore,
the data I use is based on the 2003 deﬁnitions. The deﬁnitions for MSAs from the Oﬃce
of Management and Budget are county based. However, for the New England states,
it additionally provides an alternative set of deﬁnitions: the New England City and
Town Areas (NECTAs), based on cities and towns instead of counties. In the period
2005-2014, the CPS uses the NECTA deﬁnitions to identify the MSAs of New England.
With respect to the LAUS data, it is available at the MSA level and at the county level.
The MSA level data are based on the 2015 deﬁnitions. Therefore, I use the county level
series and aggregate them at the MSA level using the 2003 deﬁnitions. I obtained the
MSA deﬁnitions from the US Census Bureau. As the CPS does not use the county
based deﬁnitions for New England, I cannot apply the MSA classiﬁcation of h and l in
the CPS observations of this region.
The 2003 deﬁnition identiﬁes 362 MSAs. According to LAUS data, the labour force
in the largest MSA, New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA, was
9,646,957 in 2014. The smallest MSA in 2014, Carson City, NV, had a labour force
of 25,116, whereas the average labour force size was 367,107. The CPS sample I use
consists of members of the labour force living in an identiﬁed MSA excluding New
England. Thus, it has 248 MSAs, which contain 90% of the labour force in MSAs.
The data obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis are at the MSA level
and based on the 2013 MSAs deﬁnitions. Since I use these data to deﬂate the nominal
wages obtained from the CPS data, it implies that the boundaries of the MSAs in the
nominal wages are not exactly the same as in the deﬂators. In addition, there are four
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MSAs identiﬁed in the CPS that do not exist in the 2013 deﬁnition because they were
merged with other cities. In those cases, I apply the deﬂator of the merged MSA.11
The data from Internal Revenue Service is at the county level and I aggregate it at
the MSA level using the 2003 MSAs deﬁnitions.
11These MSAs are Anderson, IN  (merged with Indianapolis, IN ), Anderson, SC  (merged
with Greenville, SC ), Holland-Grand Haven, MI  (merged with Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI )
and Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY  (merged with New York-Northern New Jersey-Long
Island, NY-NJ-PA).
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C Additional Tables
Table 6: Transition rates
(a) eu (b, y, ht)
ht = r ht = o
y = h y = l y = h y = l
b = 1 s+ λB s+ λB s s+ λB
b = 0 s+ λY s+ λY s+ λY s
(b) ue (b, y, ht)
ht = r ht = o
y = h y = l y = h y = l
b = 1 αy αy αy αy
b = 0 αy + εα−y αy + εα−y αy + εα−y αy + εα−y
Table 7: Distribution of home-owners and renters in the model
Home-owners Renters
h l h l
Employed 49.2 43.9 46.6 46.0
- in preferred location 46.6 43.9 46.6 46.0
- not in preferred location 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unemployed 3.4 3.6 3.4 4.0
- in preferred location 3.4 3.6 3.4 4.0
- not in preferred location 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: Percentages over total renters and total home-owners,
respectively.
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Table 8: Unemployment and transition rates (CPS)
Renters Home-owners Diﬀerence
urate 10.19% 5.55% -4.64***
ue 31.51% 31.59% 0.07
eu 3.36% 1.70% -1.66***
q 0.38% 0.15% -0.23***
Notes: Calculations based on the CPS sample used in the calibration. urate is
the unemployment rate,ue is the unemployment exit rate, eu is the employment
exit rate and q is the quits rate. Test of signiﬁcance performed on coeﬃcient β in
the regression xt = β + et with xt being the diﬀerence between the home-owners'
and the renters' rate. Coeﬃcients with *** are signiﬁcant at 1%, with ** at 5%
and with * at 10% level using Newey West.
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Table 9: Results probit regression
Unemployment
2005 2014 2005 2014
Home-owner −0.366∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age −0.010∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
College −0.417∗∗∗ −0.358∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
High School −0.276∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Asian only 0.003 −0.003
(0.015) (0.013)
Black 0.356∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Other 0.159∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015)
Admin and Service −0.252∗∗∗ −0.334∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Management −0.366∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Professional −0.346∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Sales −0.177∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Constant −1.421∗∗∗ −1.379∗∗∗ −0.758∗∗∗ −0.711∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 544,552 534,977 544,552 534,977
Notes: Coeﬃcients with *** are signiﬁcant at 1%, with ** at 5% and with * at 10% level.
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